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2) the assault, with elements common to 
the homicide, must be merged with it; and 
3) there being no underlying separate 
felony, there was no felony murder. The 
defense thus read the facts as showing an 
intent to enter the home solely to assault 
Sisler, i.e. one continuous criminal trans-
action from entry to homicide. 
The doctrine of merger, where not 
abrogated by statute, is applicable so that 
an accused will not face "double punish-
ment" for one act. At common law, the 
rule was given effect where the same act 
generated more than one offense. Klein v. 
State, 151 Md. 484, 135 A.591 (1926); 
MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, 50 (1934); CLARK AND 
MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 2.03 (7th Ed. 1968). 
The defense theory in Harris failed for 
three basic reasons. First, the burglary 
was a distinct offense committed for the 
demonstrated purpose of finding ·an in-
dividual the attackers thought was other 
than the murder victim. See Harris v. 
United States, 373 A.2d 590, 593 n. 8. 
This intent to enter to find the "third par-
ty" gave the burglary a specificity apart 
from the homicide--an element of intent 
separate from the killing. Second, 22 D.C. 
Code § 2401 proscribes as felony murder 
a killing in any housebreaking. Third, 
"[T] he societal interest served by the 
burglary statute [22 D.C. Code § 1801], 
protection of occupied dwellings, is sepa-
rate and distinct from that of the murder 
statute, security and value of the person." 
377 A.2d at 38. 
As the Court of Appeals stated in a case 
clearly on point: 
[Defendant] committed burglary by 
knowingly entering [victim's] home 
with the intent to assault him. Having 
committed the burglary and violated 
the appurtenant societal interests, it 
was still possible for [defendant] and 
his companions to withdraw from the 
premises without attacking [the vic-
tim]. But continuation of this criminal 
conduct resulted in the death. . . and 
the commission of a second distinct 
crime. 
Biango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885, 
888 (D:C. App. 1977). 
The court in Biango found that a con-
viction for felony murder was appropriate 
for policy reasons even where the criminal 
event was isolated, in terms of both mens 
rea and actus reus, to the immediate par-
ties, i.e. no intent was shown to enter for a 
purpose other than to kill the immediate 
victim. An even stronger case against 
merger is thus found in Harris where there 
are indicia of two separate criminal pur-
poses. 
In this case, where the homicide is an-
cillary to the attempted burglary, the 
following observation is appropriate: 
It is said that if [the accused] arms him-
self with the intent to shoot anyone 
who interferes with the commission of 
the burglary, he is chargeable with such 
premeditation as to render him guilty 
of murder in the first degree. 
1 WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 74 at 332 (1938). 
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Decisions 
by Robert C. Becker 
There it is, volume one, number one. It 
is all done in one paragraph and about 
one-quarter of the page. Still it is the first 
reported case in United States jurispru-
dence. 
In days when Maryland was more freely 
dispensed than it is today, one William 
Boreman filed a preliminary claim to four 
hundred acres at Nanjemoy. Charles 
County people take note. He had the 
ground surveyed, occupied it, and con-
sidered it his own. He failed, however, to 
perfect a patent to his land within the time 
specified in the original warrant. 
Meantime, Captain William Stone, ap-
parently realizing the defect in Boreman's 
claim, filed and perfected a patent to the 
same land. When Captain Stone under-
took to occupy land then his, dispute 
naturally arose. It came to the attention of 
the provincial court. Stone v. Boreman 1 
H & McH 1 (1658). 
The court held that Boreman had lost 
his claim by failing timely to perfect his 
patent. Stone was the rightful owner of 
the land in question. Boreman was still 
entitled to four hundred acres and might 
have it elsewhere in a "convenient place." 
[d. at 2. Basic equity is affordable where 
land is plentif~l. 
The interesting part of this rather short 
report concerns the treatment of the sur-
veyor who laid out Boreman's original 
claim. The court seems to hold that he 
should have known of the fault in Bore-
man's filing and should have either 
warned him of it or simply refrained from 
the commission. At any rate he is held 
responsible for surveying, without charge, 
such new claim as Boreman shall take and 
perfect. 
This is a decision hardly possible in to-
day's circumstances. Land is not granted 
four hundred acres at a time; rather it is 
bitterly litigated by the foot. It is neces-
sarily the product of an era when royal 
charters were framed in terms of latitudes 
north and south to the setting of the sun. 
Still, it is a decison embodying the virtues 
of brevity and fairness, criteria we yet 
strive to meet. 
An Afternoon Spent Browsing in the 
Dusty Section of a Small Law Library 
1 Harris & McHenry (1658) 
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